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1. Introduction
The foiled London plot ofjihadists who planned to blow up nine airplanes in the
summer of 2006 was, in a sense, a victory in the struggle against radical Islam or
Islamism.1 Nevertheless, it also left the British with a sense of disillusion, because it
had been proved again that Britain had incubated home-grown terrorists: young
people estranged from their country, ready to attack their land and its people for
violating the precepts ofan extremist ideology. The British govemment inaugurated
a commission to enquire whether the traditional multiculturalist approach was still
the most viabie way to foster asense ofBritish citizenship.2 An increasing number of
commentators felt that multiculturalism seems to divide3 the country into a plurality
ofreligious and ethnic communities and undermines the idea ofa common national
loyalty to the British state and society.4 Britain, many people felt, had been creating
a terror state from within by giving ample opportunity to radical religious preachers
who seduced youngsters into a radical and violent religious ideology.
It seems that finally the United Kingdom, the most multicultural country in the
West,5 is reconsidering the double loyalties that multiculturalism inaugurates. On 14
January 2006, Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, held a speech at the
Fabian New Year Conference, London. He asked the following question: 'Should
we do more to define a positive sense of Britishness?' 6 And his answer was: yes.
Once again, it has been terrorist acts that have given the British - like the Ameri-
cans - food for thought. Since 7 July 2005, the balance between diversity and inte-
gration has had to be reconsidered. According to Brown, you should have a dear
view of what being British mêans, what you value about being British and what
gives us purpose as a nation. Brown argues that British values call for a new consti-
tutional settlement and renewed civic patriotism.
Brown also issues a waming. When people are insecure, he says, there is always a
risk that they retreat into more exdusive identities rooted in 19th-century concep-
tions of blood, race and territory..What people tend to forget is that we should
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celebrate a British identity that is bigger than the sum of its parts and that a union is
strong because of the values we share. Race and ethnicity are not a basis for a com-
mon British identity. Even though the British response to the events of 7 July was
magnificent, we have to face the uncomfortable fact that therewere British citizens,
British bom, apparently integrated into the British community, who were prepared
to 'maim and kill fellow British citizens, irrespective of their religion'. That means
that we have to be 'far more ambitious in defining for our time the responsibilities
of citizenship'. Ifwe do not promote Britishness, we run a real risk of having a di-
vided society. 'And this British patriotism is, in my view, founded neither on eth-
nicity nor race, not just on institutions we share and respect, but on enduring ideals
which shape Our view of ourselves and our communities - values which in turn
influence the way our institutions evolve.' What then are the values that Brown
defines? Brown summarizes these as follows: 'Liberty for all, responsibility by all and
fairness to all.'
Countries like Britain seem to have serious pl'oblems regarding social cohesion,
but the problems manifest themselves in other countries as weIl. After the murder of
the Dutch filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh, the German politician Dieter
Wiefelspütz (SPD) warned his compatriots against self-complacent musings. He said,
'Holland ist überalf.7 What had happened in the Netherlands could happen every-
where, in Germany as weIl.8 This may be a bit exaggerated because there are coun-
tries with a much more homogeneous population. Nevertheless, most European
countries have a multicultural population. In most of these countries, multicultural-
ism has been the official ideology.9 Most of these countries have problems with the
integration ofreligious and ethnic minorities.
The topic I want to address in this contribution is in what sense constitutional
devices can help to foster an idea of a common identity. A preamble of a constitu-
tion usually defines the guiding ideas and principles of a national community. It
gives the people apolitical sense of direction. The question is, of course, what
should be the contents of this prearnble. The most recent discussion on this question
in Europe centered on the European Constitution. As is well-known, this Consti-
tution floundered, but this does not make the elaborate discussion on the Preamble
of this Constitution irrelevant. On the contrary. This was a highly important debate
on the question whether the Preamble of the Constitution should be religiously
neutra! or whether it should include a reference to the religions that have shaped
European history, state and society. In this contribution, I will highlight the prob-
lems connected with religious references in the European Constitution, and in con-
stitutions in general. I will argue that the multicultural composition of European
states points in the direction of a religiously neutra! preambie. This means that the
French laicist approach is more viabie as a source of inspiration for future constitu-
tiona! experiments than the British multicultural approach.
Let us fust shoot a glace at the Preamble of the European Constitution.
7 Hans Steketee, 'Holland ist überall' als schrikbeeld', NRC Handelsblad, 17 November 2004.
8 The same point is made by Günter Lachmann, Tödliche Toleranz, Munich / Zürich, 2004.
9 With respect to Gennany, see, for instance, Bassam Tibi, Europa ohne ldentität? Leitkultur oder
Wertebeliebigkeit, 2nd ed., Munich 2001 (1998).
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there is no justification for referring to these characteristics and at the same time
presenting these as a plea for the Judeo-Christian tradition (and leaving Islam
unmentioned), as the Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende does~'
On 4 and 5 October 2003, an Inter-Governmental Conference was held in
Rome. During this conference, the Dutch government argued that the Preamble
should include a reference to the Judeo-Christian tradition. 14 This was the all more
remarkable, because this plea was in stark contrast to the explicit wishes of the
Dutch Parliament.15
The W orld Council ofChurches was also in favor of the invoçatio Dei in the pre-
amble. It even waged a polemic agaÏnst 'other creeds'. The Council stated, 'Christi-
anity and other creeds should not be put on the same level', because 'Christianity
had a decisive influence on the European soil' .16
Christianity and other creeds are not equal? This was a flat denial of politically
correct speech-- codes according to which all religions should be considered equally
valuable. 17 Some people angrily replied that the W orld Council tried to minimize
the influence of the other denominations, but, when asked for clarification, the
W orld Council retreated from this finn and politically incorrect stance. The W orld
Council said it only wanted to stress the importance of Christianity, not to belittle
the position of other beliefS. The Nordic member of the Board of the World
Council, Trond Bakkevig, even wanted a reference to ancient Greek religion be-
cause of the significance of ancient Greece for the development of democracy. Ap-
parently, Bakkevig is of the opinion that ifGreece invented democracy, this inven-
tion must be attributed to Greek religion. But what the Greek pantheon has done for
democracy is far from clear. The claim that it was secular Greek philosophy that laid
thè foundations for Greek 'popular govemment seems more likely, although Bakke-
vig did not even consider this an option.18
2. Where were the Secularists?
Non-govemmental commentators participated in the discussion on the European
Constitution, too. One of the most remarkable was the Dutch intellectual Lambert
J. Giebels. He blamed the collunission chaired by Giscard d'Estaing for 'a complete
forgery of history' .19 According to Giebels, European history simply coincides with
the development of Christianity. 'From whatever angle you want to reflect on the
issue: even the most convinced European agnostic cannot deny that we have a
Christian calendar and Christian holidays, like Christmas and Easter, that determine
14 'VVD dreigt met 'nee' bij referendum EU-grondwet', NRC Handelsblad, 6 October 2003.
'15 Floris van Straten, 'Senaat bromt overgeloofsvenvijzing', NRC Handelsblad, 5 November 2003.
16 'Christendom als wortel van Europa', Trouw, 2 September 2003. .
17 Paul Bennan (ed.), Debating P.C. The Controversy over Political Correctness on College Campuses, New
York 1992;Jean Sévilla, Le Terrorisme Intellectual de 1945 à Nosjours, Paris 2004 (2000).
18 Eric W. Robinson, Andent Greek Democracy. Readings and Sources, Oxford, 2004; Richard TayIor,
Restoring Pride. The Lost Virtue ofOur Age, Buffilo, New York 1996; Richard TayIor, Ethics, Faith, and
Reason, Englewood Cliffi, NewJersey 1985; Charles Freeman, TIle Greek Achievemetlt. The Foundation
ofthe Western World, New York 1999, p. 55 f[
19 Lambert). Giebels, 'Europesegrondwet', NRC Handelsblad, 7 July 2003.
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Needless to say, the Catholic view as cited above was not prevalent during the
meetings on the European Constitution. The opponents of the radical separation of
church and state had not triumphed and were forced on the defensive. Secularists
had won their cause and the only thing they had to do is to enter the debate when
some governments, i.e. that of Poland, tried to counter the French chairman's
secularist leanings with any chance of success. When Poland protested against the
radical separation of church and state, according to the French principles, two hun-
dred Polish intellectuals criticized their government in an open letter on the Euro-
pean Constitution: In contrast to their government, these intellectuals did not want a
reference to God or Christianity in the European Constitution. 'We want a Europe
that upholds the common values, such as freedom, equality and solidarity, but we
do not need any reference to the sourees of these values, because we do not want to
exclude people or estrange people from us.' 22
On 4 November 2003, the Dutch finished their discussion of the problem dur-
ing a debate in the Upper House. Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende defended
rus stance on the Intergovernmental Conference on 4 and 5 October 2003, where-
in defiance of Parliament's wishes - he had argued in favor of a reference to the
Judeo-Christian roots of European civilization. The Prime Minister was irritated
especially by the reference to 'humanism' in the Preambie. It would be unhistorical
to ignore the Judeo-Christian traditions, while mentioning the humanist roots,
according to Balkenende.
Social-democrat senator Erik Jurgens opposed the Prime Minister with two ar-
guments. First, Jurgens contended that we do not need a preamble at all. The
Dutch Constitution does not have a preamble after all. Many other European con-
stitutions do not have a preamble either. Why do we need a preamble in Europe?
Second, Jurgens contested the claim that we need a reference to the Judeo-Christian
roots of European culture, as Balkenende had argued. Erasmus was a humanist,
Jurgens said. Contemporary humanism incorporated the values ofJudeo-Christian
culture. This plea for a secularist approach was all the more interesting, because
Jurgens made clear that he was not motivated by atheist considerations. He was a
Catholic and yet in favor of the secular state.23
3. The Preamble in National Constitutions: Five Types of Constitutions
Jurgens's contribution to the debate in the Upper House of the Dutch Parliament
put one interesting point on the agenda. Do we need a preamble at all? And if so,
what should be the content ofthe preambie?
In answering this question, it may be helpful to analyze the preambles of five
models of national constitutions and consider the pros and cons of the different
models, in particular with reference to the preambie.
22 'Polen en Europa', NRC Handelsblad, 14 October 2003. A complete list ofsubscribers is to be found on
the website ofGazeta Wyborcza: www.gazeta.pl
23 Not unlike the 19th century politica! philosopher Lamennais (1782-1854) in bis second phase ofdevel-
opment (from 1830 onwards). See Félicité de Lamennais, Introduction et notes de Louis Le Guillou,
Paroles d'un Croyant, , Paris 1973 (1834).
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A full-blown commitment to religion is to be found in the Constitution of
Saudi Arabia, adopted in March 1992. Here the Constitution is explicitly subordi-
nated to divine law. 'The Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state
with Islam as its religion', the Preamble states. It follows with: 'God's Book and the
Sunnah ofHis Prophet, God'sprayers and peace be upon him, are its Constitution. '
Not only the Preamble but ·a1so the whole Constitutional text is interspersed with
references to God and religion. Article 2 describes the inscription on the Saudi flag:
'There is but one God and Mohammed is His Prophet'. Article 6 says that citizens
are to pay allegiance to the King 'in accordance with the Holy Koran and the tradi-
tion of the Prophet, in submission and obedience'. According to Article 7, political
power is derived directly from the Holy Koran and the Prophet's tradition. Article 8
proclaims that govemment will be in accordance with the Islamic Shariah. Article 9
proclaims the familyas the kemel ofSaudi society. It continues with: 'and its mem-
bers shall be brought up on the basis of the Islamic faith, and loyalty and obedience'
to God, His Messenger, and to guardians'. Article 10'states that the state will aspire
to strengthen family ties and maintain its Arab and Islamic values. Article 11 under-
lines that Saudi society 'will be based on the principle of adherence to God's com-
mand'. Article 13 states: 'education will aim at instilling the Islamic faith in the
younger generation. '
Sometimes religious leanings in the constitutional framework do not have any
basis in the preambie. This is the case in the Constitution ofYemen. The Constitu-
tion ofYemen of 1991 does not have a Preambie. Nor is the true religious orienta-
tion of the Constitutional order manifest from the fust article of the Constitution:
'The Yemen Republic is an independent, sovereign, unitary, and indivisibie state
whose territorial integrity is inviolable. The Yemeni People is a part of the Arab
nation and the Islamic world.' But Article 2 states: 'Islam is the religion of the state
and Arabic is its official language.' Article 3: 'Islamic jurisprudence is the main
source ofiegislation.'
3.4 Constitutions of the Fourth Type: Multiculturalism
The fourth type of constitution is what I would like to call the 'multiculturalist
brand'. The Preamble of the Constitution of Poland of 1997 constitutes the ideal
compromise for many peopIe, because it mentions faith and non-faith. The Pream-
bIe runs as follows:
'Having regard for the existence and future of our Homeland, Which recovered,
in 1989, the possibility ofa sovereign and democratie determination ofits fate,
We, the Polish Nation - all citizens of the Republic,
Both those who believe in God as the souree of truth, justice, good and beauty,
As weIl as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as
arising from other sources,
Equal in rights and obligations towards the common good - Poland,
Beholden to our ancestors for their labors, their struggle for independenee
achieved at great sacrifice, for our culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the
Nation and in universa! human values,
Recalling the best traditions of the First and the Second Republic,
16
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Obliged to bequeath to future generations all that is valuable from our over one
thousand years' heritage,
Bound in community with our compatriots dispersed throughout the world,
Aware of the need for cooperation with all countries för the good of the Human
Family,
Mindful of the bitter experiences of the times when fundamental freedoms and
human rights were violated in our Homeland,
Desiring to guarantee the rights of the citizens for all time, and to ensure dili-
gence and efficiency in the work ofpublic bodies,
Recognizing our responsibiliry before God or our own consciences,
Hereby establish this Constitution of the Republic of Poland as the basic law for
the State, based on respect for freedom and justice, cooperation between the
public powers, social dialogue as weIl as on the principle of aiding in the
strengthening the powers ofcitizens and their communities.
We call upon all those who will apply this Constitution for the good of the
Third Republic to do so paying respect to the inherent dignity of the person, his
or her right to freedom, the obligation of solidarity with others, and respect for
these principles as the unshakeable foundation ofthe Republic ofPoland.'
I call this 'multiculturalist' not because any reference is made to ethnic or religious
minorities,25 but because the Polish Constitution tries to hannonize secularist and
non-secularist traditions that found a place in many preambles. As we have seen,
some commentators are very enthusiastic about the Polish compromise. Even so,
there are fierce critics as weU. Kaz Dziamka, professor of American Studies and of
Polish origin, is very critica1 of the Polish Constitutional order and the Polish Con-
stitution in particular.26 He caIls Poland a 'neo-theocracy'. The Polish 'Christian
heritage' began only a millennium ago, resulting in the tragic destruction of Slavic
culture and religion. 'When a baby is bom, a couple marries, or a person dies, there
is invariably a Polish Catholic priest at hand to quote the Bible and to coUect a fee.
In Poland it 'is becoming increasingly rare not to have a monument dedicated, a
new school opened, or even a car purchased without its being consecrated by a
cassock-clad personage wielding an aspergillum (also a fee, of course).' When
America's young democracy was threatened by Patrick Henry's bili to establish a
provision for the teachers of Christianity, it was James Madison who averted the
danger by arguing against legal support for the Christian religion.27 Sadly there are
no Madisons orJeffersons in the Warsaw Belweder (the Polish President's residence)
and the influence ofthe Catholic Church is visible everywhere.
25 On this kind of multiculturalism, see Will Kymlicka, IJberalism, Community and Culture, Oxford 1991
(1989); Brian Barry, Culture & Equality. An egalitarian critique ofmulticulturalism, Cambridge 2001; Gerd
Baumann, The Multicultural Riddle. Rethinking national, ethnic, and. religious identities, New York and
London 1999; Andreas Kinneging, 'Multiculturalisme, relativisme en mensenrechten', in P.B. Cliteur
& V. Van Den Eeckhout, eels., Multiatlturalisme, Cultuurrelativisme en Sociale Cohesie, The Hague 2001,
pp.9-103.
26 Kaz Dziamka, 'Polish prelates turn back the doek', Free Inquiry, Vol.. 22, Issue 2, 1 April 2002.
27 James Madison, 'Memorial and Remonstranee against Religious Assessments', in James Madison,
'Writings, NewYork 1999, pp. 9-39.
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Another conunentator, Andrzej Flis, professor of sociology at Jagiellonian Uni-
versity in Cracow, states that after the communist era had ended, Poland was
launched down the road leading back to an ideological state. 'The bishops decided
to fill the post-Marxist doctrinal vaeuum with Catholic fundamentalism. ' 28 There is
religious instruction in state schools. According to W ojcieeh Lamentowiez, de-
mocratie values should be protected by a powerful, authoritarian church rather than
a powerful, authoritarian state. Adam Michnik warned against the impending 'Irani-
zation' of the country. Sometimes the Polish Chureh aeknowledges confessional
influence as weIl. Cardinal Jozef Glemp, the Primate of Poland, stated that the
country was choosing between two systems ofvalues: Christian and neopagan.
3.5 Constitutions ofthe Fifth Type: Secular or Laidst
Finally, there are the constitutions that are inspired by secularist ideas on the separa-
tion ofchurch and state. The Constitution of the French Republic is, ofcourse, me
best-known, but it is not the only example. The Freneh 1958 Constitution starts
with the following Preambie.
'The French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man
and the principles ofnational sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789,
confinned and complemented by the preamble to the Constitution of 1946. By
virtue of these principles and that of the self-determination of Peoples, the Re-
public offers to the overseas territories that express the will to adhere to them
new institutions founded on the common ideal of liberty, equality and fraternity
and conceived with a view to their democratie development.'
The important secular direction of the French Constitution is not shown by the
Preambie, but by the fust artide of the Constitution. There we find: 'France shall be
an indivisibie, secular, democratie and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of
all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall
respect all beliefS. It shall be organized on a decentralized basis.'
A second example of a constitution with a secular orientation is the Turkish
Constitution.29 The Preamble indudes a reference to 'the modernism of Atatürk'
and the 'principle ofsecularism', defined as:
'There shall be no interference whatsoever of the sacred religious feelings in State
affairs and polities'. Atatürk is called 'the immortalleader and the unrivalled hero'
who put the Turkish Republic on the track of this principle (here we find an
element ofwhat I have called the second type ofconstitutions: constitutions with
historical and ideological references). The preamble states that no individual or
body empowered to exercise the sovereignty in name of the nation 'shall deviate
from liberal democracy and the legal system instituted according to its require-
ments.'
28 Andrzej Flis, 'The Polish church as the enemy of the open soàety', Free Inquiry, Vol. 17, No. 1Janu-
ary 1996.
29 Bemard Lewis, TI1e Emèrgence <?fModern Turkey, Third Editión, Oxford and New York 2002 (1961),
p. 02 tI
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There is also a reference to secular ideals in the Preamble to the Constitution of
India:
'We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a
sovereign socialist secular democratic republic and to secure to all its citizens:
justice, social, economie and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith
and worship;
equality of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all fraternity
assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity ofthe nation;
in our constituent assembly this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do hereby
adopt, enact and gÏve to ourselves this constitution.'
Finally, reference has to be made to the Italian Constitution. Italy is a Catholic
country, but the Constitutional order has a laicist orientation. Article 1 of the Con-
stitution informs us about the form of the state: (1) Italy is a democratie republic
based on labor. (2) The sovereignty belongs to the people who exercise it in the
forms and limits of the Constitution. Article 7 addresses the relationship between
church and state:
'(1) State and Catholic Church are, each within their own reign, independent
and sovereign. (2) Their relationship is regulated by the Lateran Pacts. Amend-
ments to these pacts which are accepted by both parties do not require the pro-
cedure ofconstitutional amendments.'
Article 8 states:
'(1) Religious denominations are equally free before the law. (2) Denominations
other than Catholicism have the right to organize themselves according to their
own by-laws, provided they do not conflict with the ltalian legal system. (3)
Their relationship with the state is reguiated by law, based on agreements with
their represehtatives.'
4. Criticism of Secularism
Although still an important source of influence in the European Convention, secu-
larism has attracted severe criticism in the last few decades.30 Probably, this has to do
with the failed attempts at forced secularization in the Soviet Union and fonner
Eastem Bloc countries,31 and perhaps also with the criticism of some forms of 19th
century atheism and agnosticism.32 The recent revival of fundamentalist movements
30 See David N. F. Gellner, 'Studying secularism, practising secularism. Anthropological perspectives',
Sodal Anthropology, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2001, pp. 37-340; Lale Ya1çin-Heckmann, 'Three points on secu-
larism and anthropology', in Sodal Anthropology, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2001, pp. 34-336.
31 Paul Froese, 'Forced Secularization in Soviet Russia: Whyau Atheistic Monopoly Failed',]ournalfor
the Scientffic Study ofReligion, 43:1 (2004), pp. 5-40.
32 On 19'h century secularist traditions, see Mark Bevir, 'Annie Besant's Quest for Truth: Christianity,
Secularism and New Age Thought', in]ournal of Ecdesiastical Ristory, Vol. 50, No. 1, January 1999,
pp.2-93; A.N. Wilson, God's Funeral, London 1999; A.N. Wilson, The Vutorians, London 2002;
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have also challenged the secularization thesis.33 Other people criticized the idea of
the secular state with regard to government-sponsored education facilities.34
The problem is that secularism is much too vague a concept. The tenn was
coined by George Jacob Holyoake (1817-1906) in 1842. He tried to introduce
'secularism' as an altemative to 'atheism', which he considered to be too negative.35
Secu1arism should focus on the problems ofthis world rather than the next.
This attempt to introduce less controversial termïnology has failed, however, be-
cause nowadays the tenn 'secularism' is just as vague as 'atheism' and equally over-
loaded with negative associations. In this contribution I can't not go into the many
aspects of secularism, but dweil on one· specific aspect only: the idea that the state
has to be religiously neutral. And that neutrality means an orientation·on universal
and objective norms that are acceptable to all the citizens within the politica! order.
In this sense, secularism is not necessarily connected with atheism. A secular state
can be advocated by Christians, Muslims, Jews and representatives ofother denomi-
nations. The secularist contends that an 'open society -cannot be based on a religious
model ofsocial cohesion that is always particularistic although it pretends to be uni-
versalistic. ' 36
5. Joseph Weiler's Postmodern Confessional Multiculturalism
One of the most remarkable contributions to the debate on the Preamble of the
European Constitution was an essay written by the orthodox Jewish scholar J .H.H.
Weiler.37 Bom to a Jewish father in South Africa, Weiler is a constitutional scholar,
who, according to the editors of an important essay on the Preamble of the Euro-
pean Constitution, 'takes his belief seriously'.38 He is also an authority in the field of
European law and a professor at New York University. In 2003, Weiler published
Alister McGrath, The Twilight ofAtheism. The rise andfall ofdisbeliif in the modern world, New York etc.
2004.
33 Daniel Philpott, 'The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations', Worid
Polities, 55 October 2002, pp. 6-95; Jan Tarik, 'Mawdudi's Critique ofthe Secular Mind', The Muslim
Worid, Vol. 93., July/October 2003, pp.03-519; Terrance G. Carroll, 'Secularization and States of
Modernity', World Polities, Vol. 36 No. 3 (April 1984), pp. 62-382.
34 For instance: B.C. Labuschagne & H.-M. T. D. ten Nape1, 'Overheidstàcilitering voor godsdienstige
denominaties', in P.B. Cliteur & V. Van Den Eeckhout, eds., Multiculturalisme, Cultuurrelativisme en
Sociale Cohesie, The Hague 2001, pp. 53-471; H.M.Th.D. ten Napel, 'A brick from the wall': Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris et al. en het einde van de strikte scheiding tussen l:cerk en staat op onderwijsgebied
in Amerika', in P.B. Cliteur & H.-M.Th.D. ten Nape1 (eds.) , Rechten, Plichten, Deugden, Nijmegen
2003, pp. 85-193.
35 George Jacob Holyoake and Charles Bradlaugh, 'Is Secularism Atheism?', in Gordon Stein, A Second
Anthology ofAtheism and Rationalism, BuHàlo, New York 1987, pp. 45-369.
36 This quotation comes from L.P.H.M. Buskens, 'De Gemeenschap derMoslims. Opvattingen over
islamitische saamhorigheid in theorie en praktijk', in B.C. Labuschage (ed.), Religie als Bron van Sociale
Cohesie in de Democratische Rechtsstaat?, Nijmegen 2004, pp. 19-145, esp. p. 40. With these words,
Buskens defines the essence of the idea of the secular state, although the remainder ofhis essay shows
that he does not support it. See also Va1i Nasr, 'Religion and Global Aflàirs: Secular States and Reli-
gious Oppositions', Sais Review, February 18, 1998, pp. 2-37, andJohn Swom1ey, Religious Iiberty and
the Secular State, The Constitutional Context, Buflàlo, New York 1987.
37 J .H.H. Weiler, Een Christelijk Europa. Een verkennend essay, Publicaties van de rechts- en bestuurskundige
qfdeling van het Thijmgenootschap, introduced and translated by Leonard Besselink and Thomas Mertens,
Deventer 2004, (originally in ltalian, Milán 2003).
38 See Besselink and Mertens' introduction in Weiler, Een Christelijk Europa.
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I will comment on the critique that liberal globalism generates (or fails
to mitigate) a widening of the gap between the rich and the poor only
in so far as it is relevant as a reflection of the liberal constitutional model.
I
I will therefore treat the question of whether the ~ntroduction of a special
class of social and economic rights is indeed a solution for the social
and economic problems and the unequal distribution of wealth. I think
that it is not.
As I said above, my conclusion is that the liberal ideology is superior
to the available alternatives. I view the liberal oudook as universal in
the sense that it should be introduced into other cultures where at pre-
sent it has no firm base.
The success of liberal ideology also makes it vulnerable to reactions
with undermining tendencies. One of these reactions involves the refor-
mulation of social policies in the vocabulary of human rights. So-called
economic and social rights are no part of the liberal" ideology. Social
and economic rights should be considered as directive principles of state
poliey, not as "rights" in the proper sense of the word.
2.2 MAN AS A FREE, RATIONAL AND
AUTONOMOUS BEING
Eva Nieuwenhuys, the editor of this book and auctor intellectualis of the
whole project, has pointed out the roots of liberal globalism: its view of
man. The liberal oudook has its roots in the liberal view of man. Let
us therefore first address liberalism's philosophical anthropology. The lib-
eral view of man is certainly not overly optimistic, nor, however, is it
cynical. From the standpoint of liberal anthropology, man can lead his
own life under the governance of reason. Mter the critiques which have
flowed from postmodernism, vitalism, psychoanalysis, and structuralism,
is it still possible to defend such a view of man?
A common distinction made in this regard is that between "mod-
ernism" and "postmodernism". The Enlightenment principles of classi-
cal liberalism are qualified as "modernism".12 But modernism-so its
critics contend-has properly become the target of a devastating reap-
praisal. This critical oudook on modemism has essential flaws. Postmodern
authors maintain that man is not a free, self-governing, rational being.
12 See on modernism: Kolocotroni, Vassiliki, & Goldman, ]ane, & Taxidou, Olga
(eds.), Modemism: An Anthology qfSourees and Documents (Edinburgh University Press-Edinburgh
1998). On the Enlightenment the bibliographical material is very extensive. A recent
influential book is: J.I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the Making qf Modemity
1650-1750 (Oxford University Press-Oxford/New York 2001):
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Russeli remained within the cadre of the liberal enlightenment view of
man and cherished this vision all his life (a very long life indeed).18
Of course there were also more radical optimistic representatives of
the Enlightenment and liberal tradition such as Condorcet. In the Discourse
delivered on February 21, 1782 at the famous Académie française,
Condorcet said:
Placés à cette heureuse époque, et témoins des derniers efforts' de l'igno-
rance et de l'erreur, nous avons vu la Raison sortir victorieuse de cette
lutte si longue, si pénible, et nous pouvons nous écrier enfin : la Vérité a
vaincu ; Ie Genre humain est sauvé ! Chaque siècle ajoutera de nouvelles
lumières à celles du siècle qui l'aura précédé ; et ces progrès, que rien
désormais ne peut arrêter ni suspendre, n'auront d'autres homes que celles
de la durée de l'univers. 19 .
A happy Age! Ignorance and falsehood finally swept away. Reason tri-
umphant. Humanity saved-at last. This was the mood of Condorcet
and some other Enlightenment thinkers. It was certainly, however, not
the tone of the far·· more sceptical Voltaire, whose loyal apostle Condorcet
only pretended to beo Nor was it the same temperament that we encounter
in Immanuel Kant's classic essay on the Enlightenment, published two
years after Condorcet's inaugural address. Kant wrote: "If we are asked,
'Do we now live in an enlightened age?' the answer is, 'No', but we do
live in an age of enlightenment. As things now stand, much is lacking which
prevents men from being, or easily becoming, capable of correctly using
their own reason in religious matters with assurance and free from out-
side direction."20 Modemity, Enlightenment, liberalism or neo-liberalism
should gladly embrace this Kantian and Voltairian tradition, more than
that of the optimistic attitude of Condorcet. Interestingly, the Kantian
heritage was indeed the dominant tradition of Enlightenment. Thus,
dominant in Enlightenment thought have been both the more cautious
modemists, Russeil and Freud, as weil as their predecessors, (to name a
few sources from the classic Enlightenment) Voltaire and Kant.21
18 See B. Russell, VVhat] Believe, With a New Preface by A1an Ryan (Routledge-
London and New Vork 2004 (1925)). Ryan also goes into the similarities and differences
between Freud and Russell.
19 Condoreet, 'Discours prononcé à l'Académie française', in: F. Léotard & P. Wajsman,
avec collaboration de C. Piat, Paroles d']mmortels. Les plus beaux discours prononcés à rAcadémie
française, Avant-propos par Jean-Denis Bredin de l'Académie française, Vol. I (Éditions
Ramsay-Paris 2001) pp. 125-135, p. 129.
20 I. Kant, 'What is Enlightenment?', 1784, in: Kramnick, Isaac (ed.), The Portable
Enlightenment Reader, Edited and with Introduction by I. Kramnick (Penguiri Books-
Harmondsworth 1995), pp. 1-7, p. 6.
21 See for a radical misconceived vision on Voltaire: J. Gray, Voltaire. Voltaire and Enlighten-
ment (Phoenix-London 1998). Much better is the classic: P. Gay, Voltaire's polities, TIe
poet as realist (Yale University Press-New Haven and London f988 (1959)).
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It is this more realistic side of the Enlightenment, a cautious (although
radical Enlightenment),22 that still can still guide US.23 Man is a free,
rational and self-goveming individual in the sense that this is the voca-
tion of man. He can reach this goal through efforts to transform culture.
The Enlightenment will not realize itself through an autonomous historical
process but rather through human effort. Many enlightenment thinkers
were activists, philosophers (though not necessarily philosophers in the
technical sense of the word) and public intellectuals. They criticized man's
inability and laziness "to make use of his understanding without direc-
tion from another". Kant opened one essay with his famous definition
of Enlightenment as "man's release from rus self-incurred tutelage".24
If we study the dominant view of man held by those theoreticians
who subscribe to liberal globalism, we also see that it is the more real-
istic anthropology of Voltaire and Kant, not the minority viewpoint of
Condorcet.
A locus classicus for this sensible tradition within Enlightenment thought
is the plea made by James Madison for the rule of law, based on a real-
istic anthropology. Madison was one of the founding fathers of the
American constitution. Together with Hamilton and Jay, in 1787 he
wrote, the Federalist Papers,the first great exposition of the ideas behind
(and included in) the American constitution. Just as Jefferson is consid-
ered to be the man behind The Declaration of Independence, so Madison was
the man behind The Federalist Papers.
2.3 IF MEN WERE ANGELS
We find Madison's view of man set out in The Federalist, no. 51 where
he says:
But what is government itself hut the greatest of all reflections on human
nature? If men were angels, no govemment would he necessary. If angels
were to govem men, neither external nor intemal controls on government
would he necessary. In framing a govemment which is to he administered
hy men over men, the great .difficulty lies in this: you must first enahle
the government to control the govemed; and in the next place oblige it
to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no'douht, the primary
control on the government; hut experience has taught mankind the neces-
sity of auxiliary precautions.25
22 See J.I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the Making of Modemity 1650-1750
(Oxford University Press-Oxford/New Vork 2001).
23 See for instanee: S. Rushdie, 'Do we have to fight the battle for the. Enlightenment
over again?' in: The Independent, 22 January 2005.
24 Kant, Ibid. 1.
25 Madison in: J. Madison, A. Hamilton, J. J ay, The Federalist Papers, Isaac Kramnick
(ed.) (Penguin Books 1987 (1788)), essay no. 51, pp. 319-320.
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Let us try to deduce the central elements of-this passage. The central
idea is a view of man. Man is no angel. If men were angels, people
would not harm each other. You would need no police, no army, no
weapons, and no private property. Life would· he a paradise on earth.
But, we all know such a life is an unattainable utopia. People can be
nasty and vicious, and therefore we need an organisation to protect us
from the criminals and hooligans, For that organisation to be success-
ful, it needs power. Perhaps not the unlimited power of the Hobbesian
Leviathan, but power nonetheless.26
Here we encounter a prohlem. That organisation, the state or govern-
ment, is run by men. And men are no angels. This truth applies to peo-
ple in the sense of citizens as weIl as to the rulers of such a state. Thus,
we must consider what sort of mechanisms might be developed to con-
trol the controllers. It was for this purpose that democracy and the rule
of law were invented.
7he Federalist Papers present a theory of the state with two elements.
First, the state is (and needs to he) a concentration of power. Second,
the power of the state must he limited. And, a balance must exist between
the two.
2.4 THE STATE AS CONCENTRATION OF POWER
Many people, particularly legal scholars, tend to overestimate the "ideal
dimension" of the state: the limitation of state power by means of law
and democracy. Judged from the perspective of legal bias, that overes-
timation is understandahle, hut one-sided nevertheless. Security and order
provide the basis for determining statehood. Without effective control over
the territory of the state, no state exists. Thus, the rule of law, democ-
racy, human rights-all-necessarily presuppose the existence of a state.
The distinction is critica! between security and control on the one hand
and ideals such as freedom of speech, freedom of movement and many
other civilliberties on the other. A state without freedom of speech may
not be a good place to live (It would not be deemed a "constitutional
state" or a "state under the rule of law"), but such a state can exist.
That's the reason why some writers, such as Hobbes, MachiavelIi, Von
Treitschke and Carl Schmitt, laid heavy emphasis on the power of the
state. "Der Staat ist Macht", Von Treitschke said. Carl Schmitt, when
considering the nature of the constitutional state, writes that it presupposes
the state: "Der Staat selhst, der kontrolliert werden soli, wird in diesem
26 See Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, Richard Tuck (ed.) (Camhridge University Press-
Camhridge 1996 (1651 )). .
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System vorausgesetzt." Schmitt approvingly quotes Mazzini: "Die Freiheit
konstituiertnichts".27
A contemporary representative of this tradition is the British philoso-
pher John Gray. In his book Heresies, he make a plea for a strong state:
"Better the Hobbesian clarity of Ronald Rumsfeld than the unpre-
dictability and bombast of Bill Clinton."28 At the beginning of the 20th
century, it was the strong state that posed a problem. Nowadays, it is
the weakness of the state that poses the greatest threat. In many parts
of the world the state has fallen apart. 29 Gray points to liberal ideology
as bearing the responsibility for this deterioration. "Liberals-mesmer-
ized by the terrible record of state-sponsored crimes against humanity-
continue to believe that the main challenge of politics is to limit state
power. Believing there are human freedoms that must never be violated,
they insist that everything governments do be consistent with human
rights. "30 According to Gray this is wrong. "At bottom, the state exists
to secure peace. Whenever peace is at odds with liberty, it is always lib-
erty that loses out. As Hobbes knew, what human beings want most
from the state is not freedom but protection. This may be regrettable,
but building apolitical philosophy on the denial of human nature is
foolish."31 If you want to be free, you need fiTst to be safe. "For that,
you need astrong state."32
2.5 THE STATE UNDER THE RULE OF LAW
Nevertheless, once that a state exists, one can think about its potential
for growing into an "optimum state". Once life is realized, we can ponder
over the good life. The ideal of the state in many parts of the world is
a state under the mIe of law. The ambition to subject state power to
the rule of law is called constitutionalism.
Initially the British made a great contribution to constitutionalism.
According to the great scholar A.V. Dicey constitutionalism meant sub-
jecting the state to ordinary law.33 This principle, the principle of legal-
ity, was considered, in fact, to be the ABCs of constitutionalism.
27 C. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, Sechste, unveränderte Auflage (Duncker & Humblot-Berlin
1983 (1928)), p. 200. "
28 J. Gray, Heresies. Against Progress and Other Illusions (Granta Books-London 2004), p. 97.
29 R.D. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy' (1994), in: The Goming Anarclry. Shattering the
Dreams of the Post Gold War (Random House-New Vork 2000), pp. 3-59.
30 Gray, Ibid. p. 109.
31 Gray, Ibid. p. 110.
32 Gray, Ibid. p. 114.
33 Advocated in: A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Law .of the Gonstitution, Tenth edition,
with introduction by E.C.S. Wade (Macmillan Education-London 1987 (1885)).
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scribes the rules 9f the community. The judicial department is the weak-
.est branch: it needs the power of judicial review to redress this im-
balance.
This passage from the Federalist Papers was the souree of inspiration
for John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
to introduce judicial review into the American constitutional system in
the epochal case Marbury v. Madison in 1803. Marshall said:
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those lim-
its may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation com-
mitted to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those
intended to be restrained? The distinction, between government with lim-
ited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the
persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed,
are of equal obligation.
And then the famous words follow: "It is a proposition too plain to be
contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to
it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by any ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution
is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary legislative
means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other
acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it."35
These words have been of great significanee to the modern concept
of higher law. Marshall integrated judicial review as an essential element
into the modem concept of constitutionalism.
2.6 IS LmERAL GLOBALISM A UNIVERSAL IDEAL?
The model of a democratie state under the rule of law is-to my mind-
a universal ideal. It is not aspecific preoccupation of Western man but
of man in general. Why? "
This has to do with the universality of the view of human nature as
expounded by Madison. I do think there are some universals with regard
to human nature. There was no golden state of nature (as Seneca thought)
or (as the Bible describes) a state we have fallen from and can return
tO.36 Nor will there be a future historical stage where human nature will
be radically different from what it is now (as Trotsky thought would he
35 See on. this case: R.L. Clinton, 'Precedent as Mythology: A Reinterpretation of
Marbury v. Madison', in: TIe American Joumal ofJurisprudenee (1990), pp. 55-86.
36 See J.B. Bury, TIe Idea of Progress. An Inquiry into the Origin and Growth (MacMillan
and Co.-London 1920), p. 15.
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the world? Safranski characterizes individualism as one of the most impor-
tant achievements of the political and philosophical culture of Europe
("Errungenschaft der politischen und philosophischen Kultur Europas").
Individualism in this sense is based on the idea of the plurality of cul-
tures and interests. Europe's history is intimately connected with the idea
that the state and society have to be organized in a way that allows
human individuality to "flourish and develop" ("Diese norrnative
Entscheidung ist mit der Idee verbunden, Staat und gesellschaftliches
Leben müssten so organisiert werden, dass Menschen ihre Individualität
voll entfalten können, ohne sich wechselseitig dabei zu behindern.")43
This is all very weIl, but Safranski does not seem to realize that these
are all liberal ideals. Ris plea is in the great tradition of John Stuart
Mill's glorification of individual freedom in On Liberf:Y.44
Another former liberal who developed into a vehement critic of lib-
eralism and of Enlightenment ideals is the British philosopher John Gray.
According to Gray, Western societies are governed by the belief that
modemity is a single condition-everywhere the same and always benign.
"As societies become more modern, so they become more alike. At the
same time they become better. Being modem means realising our values-
the values of the Enlightenment, as we like to think of them."45 Gray
speaks of "Enlightenment faith" that spilled over into the 19th century
positivism of August Comte and others. As we have seen before, the
world view that Gray characterizes as that of "The Enlightenment" is
simply only from one of its specific but varied strands. It is the optimistic
way of thinking exemplified by Condorcet. But, it is certainly not Enlight-
enment tout court. It not even a dominant tradition within Enlightenment
thought.
In his later work Gray becomes more and more radical. In one of
his last collection of essays he rejects the idea of knowledge in general.
"In modem times", he tells us, "nothing is more heretical than the idea
that knowledge can De a sin, and it is this thought that inspires the essays
that are collected here."46 What could that mean-the conviction that
knowledge can be a sin-? Of course, knowledge can be used in a way
that is inimical to important human ideals, such as the knowledge of
chemistry for the fabrication of chemical weapons. But should that imply
that knowledge itself is a sin? And what would "sin" mean in this
43 Safranski, Ibid. p. 75.
44 JS. Mill, On Liberry (Penguin Books-Harmondsworth 1977 (1859)).
45 J Gray, Al Qaeda and what it means to be modern (Faber and Faber-London 2003), p. 1.
46 J Gray, Heresies. Against Progress and Other Illusions (Granta Books-London 2004), p. 6.
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the world.53 There is in this astrong convergence among political systems
in the world. The world is increasingly a global politica~ order in the
sense that democracy and the rule of law are the norm almost every-
where. That does not only apply to the Western world, but to other
parts of the world as well. In that sense liberalism has a global significance,
a fact that even its severest critics do not deny.
We have to distinguish, though, between two meanings of liberal
Globalism. The first meaning is descriptive. A "liberal globalist" can
claim that in fact the politicalorder of the world is one. Everywhere
countries try to be democracies and states under the rule of law. It was
Francis Fukuyama who, in his thesis on the end of history, formulated
this aspect of liberal globalism. Political history has come to an end.
Everywhere liberal democracy is the model governments try to achieve.54-
Ris theory has come under heavy criticism,55 but substantially, I believe,
his thesis remains firm.
There is also another meaning of the term "liberal globalism", one
in the normative sense. If you subscribe to liberal globalism in this nor-
mative sense you see liberal democracy as the best model for political
govemance. Personally I do. And, having done so, I see no reason to
withhold this model from other people. This conviction has much to do
with Madison's reflection on human nature. Madison is right. Men are
no angels. They never were, and they never will beo I conclude that
there must be one (and the same) politica! model that is applicable to
all of mankind.
Now that I have proclaimed liberal globalism as a universal ideal for
all people and all nations, I want to address aspecific characteristic of
the American political tradition that distinguishes it from the European
model. What strikes the attentive student of the American political sys-
tem is the absence of what might be characterized as social constitutional
rights. Why is this so? And should we, Europeans, also follow the American
example in this respect?
53 See CJ. Friedrich, T7ze Impact ofAmerican Constitutionalism Abroad (Boston University
Press-Boston, Massachusetts 1967).
54 F. Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', in: TIe National Interest, No. 16, Summer 1989,
pp. 3-18, also in: P. Schumaker, D.e. Kiel, T.W. Heilke (eds.), Ideological Voices. An
Anthology in Modem Political Ideas (The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.-New Vork etc. 1997),
pp. 409-417.
55 Implicitly but in an influential· way by S.P. Huntington, T7ze Clash of Civilizations and
the Remaking of World Order (Simon & Schuster-New York 1996).
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(previously presented as a lecture in 1949) tided Citizenship and Social Class
wherein he advocated a new conception of citizenship. Modern çitizen-
ship would make an orientation on social rights necessary.65
Why is this not a good plan? Why is this step a deviation from the
model of liberal democracy as defended in the classic American tradi-
tion of the founding fathers not an improvement to but a deterioration
of the ideal of liberal democracy? I think there are three arguments
against the introduction of social and economic rights as a new class of
human or constitutional rights.
2.9 THREE ARGUMENTS AGAINST
THE FOUR FREEDOMS
(i) Social constitutional rights disturb the separation and balance of state powers.
One of the fiTst arguments against the introduction of social constitu-
tional rights is that it disrupts the sound idea of the separation and bal-
ance of state powers. According to the weil known theory of Montesquieu66
and others, a distinction should be made between the making of laws
under the legislative powers, the administration of law under the executive
powers, and the making of judicial judgments as performed by the judi-
ciary. There should be a particular balance between the different branches
of the state. Judicial review is legitimate under the condition that the
exercise of the judicial power does not exceed its limits and transgress
into matters that are within the sole province of the legislative or the
executive.
(ii) Social constitutional rights undermine the democratie idea. Another problem
with treating social and economic rights as constitutional rights is that
sueh treatment necessarily would withhold from the people the power
to govern their own affairs. A.V. Dicey formulated the democratie idea
in 1885 with the British çonstitutional system in mind: that it is Parliament
who is responsible for polities and that the judiciary has to conform to
this division of powers.67 Although this principle is less stricdy applied
65 T.H. Marshall, 'Citizenship and Socia! Class', in: T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship
and Social Class (Doubleday 1963), quoted here in: R.E. Goodin and P. Pettit, Contemporary
Political PhilosopfFy. An Anthology (Blackwell, Cambridge (Mass.) and Oxford 1997), pp.
291-319.
66 Montesquieu, Oeuvres complètes, II, Texte présenté et annoté par R. Caillois (Éditions
Gallimard 1951) (De l'Esprit des lois, Chapitre VI, De la Constitution d'Angleterre), pp.
396-407.
67 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Law cf the Constitution, Tenth edition, with introduction
by E.C.S. Wade (Macmillan Education-London 1987 (1885)).
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in the 21st century than was the case in the 19th century, it still provides
a viabie point of departure.68 It is still this attitude that lies behind much
criticism ofthe rights revolution in genera!. "The proposals for a writ-
ten constitution, for a Bili of Rights, for a House of Lords with greater
powers to restrain govemmental legislation, for regional assemblies, for
a supreme court to monitor all these proposals, are attempts to write
Iaws so as to prevent Her Majesty's Government from exercising pow-
ers which hitherto that govemment has exercised", according to J.A.G.
Griffith.69 Where it all comes down to is the desire to substitute polities
for law. And this is an impossible undertaking.70 Law cannot take the
pIace of polities. "They merely pass political decisions out of the hands
of politicians and into the hands of judges and other persons", com-
ments Griffith on those utopians who try to force a bili of rights on the
British system.71
(iii) Social constitutional rights undermine the budgetary right of the legislative.
Intimately connected with these two sets of arguments, just discussed
previously, is the further point that socials rights as constitutional rights
would undermine the right of legislature to control the purse strings.
To understand what this argument means, let us go back to the
Federalist papers, in particular No. 78 written by Alexander Hamilton..
There, Hamilton proposes to "attentively consider the different depart-
ments of power."72 "The Executive", writes Hamilton, "not only dis-
penses the honours but holds the sword of the community". As for
powers of the legislature, it can be said that this branch "not only com-
mands the purse but prescribes the rules by which. the duties and rights
of every citizen are to be regulated." And, as for the judiciary, Hamilton
asserted that this branch was to have no inftuence over the sword or
the purse. The judiciary "can take no active resolution whatever'~.
68 See C.M. Zoethout, 'Rechten van de mens na vijftig jaar "thuisgebracht". Labours
voorstel de Europese Conventie te incorporeren in het Britse rechtsstelsel', in: .NJB, 12
juni 1998, pp. 1067-1072 and]. Goldsworthy, The Sovereignry qf Parliament. History and
Philosophy (Clarendon Press-Oxford 1999).
69 ].A.G. Griffith, 'The Political Constitution', in: The Modern Law Review, Vol. 42, No.
1, 1979, pp. 1-21, p. 16.
70 See for a more extensive critique of rights-talk:]. Waldron, 'A Right-Based Critique
of ConstitutionalRights', in: Oxford Joumal qf Legal Studies, 13 (1993), pp. 18-51; M.A.
Glendon, Rights Talk. The Impoverishment Of Political Discourse (The Free Press-New Vork
1991); C. Wellman, The Proliferation qf Rights. Moral Progress or Empry Rhetoric? (Westview
Press, Boulder, Oxford 1999).
71 Griffith, Ibid. p. 16.
72 ]. Madison, A. Hamilton and ].1. Kramnick (ed.), Federalist papers (Penguin Books-
Harmondsworth 1987), p. 437.
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It is on the basis of these considerations that Hamilton considers that
the judiciary "from the nature of its functions, will always be the least
dangerous to the political rights of the constitution." Hamilton would
thus be shocked if he were to learn what power the judiciary nowadays
exercises. Dicey would share his feeling were he to read the plans for
a Bill of Rights for Britain.
If social constitutional rights were ever to be acknowledged in the
sense that allowed them the same status as classic rights, the judicial
power would be almost limidess. The judiciary would have power over
the "purse", and this should never happen-not even with all the "wis-
dom" of the world. The "least dangerous branch" would transform itself
in-in the words of Max Weber-kadi-justiz (a government by judges).73
2.10 WHAT TO DO WITH THE SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC RIGHTS AS FORMULATED?
Let us suppose now that social politics can best be formulated by the
government. The question still remains: what to do with the social and
economic rights which already have been granted constitutional status?
What to do with the social rights in the ICESCR? Should we abolish
them? That seems not to be a very realistic option. It appears than we
are already caught in a dangerous trap. Realizing social and economic
rights would ruin our system of separated powers and transform a democ-
racy in a kind of judicial dictatorship. Abolishing the social rights already
integrated into our constitution and international agreements is practi-
cally impossible. What we could do, I think, is twofold: (1) maintain the
existing structure but interpret social rights in a more realistic way and
(2) refrain from creating new social constitutional rights. The use the
vocabulary of efforts and application of directive principles would be an
improvement over the present situation. We should interpret what have
been called "social rights" as "directive principles of state policy" and
not as present rights, as is the case with the classic rights.
2.11 SOCIAL RIGHTS AS "DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES"
How to properly address soeial rights as directive principles is something
many Western constitution-makers can learn from constitution-makers
from other parts of the world.
Consider the constitution of Namibia which contains a· Chapter 11
"Principles of State Policy". These principles are introduced in Art. 95
73 See P. Dassen, De onttovering van de wereld. Max Weber en het probleem van de moderniteit
in Duitsland, 1890-1920 (Uitgeverij G.A. van Oorschot-Amsterdam 1999), p. 175.
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with the words "The State shall active1y promote and maintain the wel-
fare of the people by adopting, inter alia, policies aimed at the follow-
ing". What follows is that legislation always has to conform to the equal
treatment of men and women; legislation has to aim at realizing the
health of the workers; all citizens have an equal share· in the public facil-
ities of the state.
This is not the language of rights ("rights-talk"), but rather the language
setting out what efforts that the state must make to realize certain aims.
"The State shall endeavour to ensure that in its international relations
it (...)" and what follows is the way the state wants to conduct itself in
its international relations (Art. 96). That is also manifest in the way asy-
lum is treated in the constitution. There is no right to asylum; the for-
mulation is different: "The State shall, where it is reasonable to do so,
grant asylum to persons who reasonably fear persecution on the ground
of their political beliefs, race, religion or membership of a particular
social group."
Apart form these principles of state policy, there is a separate chap-
ter on "Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms". There we find: "a
right to life shall he respected and protected" (Art. 6). The death penalty
is also rejected: "No law may prescribe death as a competent sentence".
And here we also find the classic rights to freedom of speech, liberty,
human dignity, fair trial and privacy. A peculiar feature of the Narnibian
constitution is that it has a provision on the rights of children. A child
has the right to a name, nationality and legislation that protects the
interests of children. T 0 avoid the language of rights thete are various
options. Sometirnes one speaks of "entitled to", in other occasions different
words are used.
A second example is drawn from the constitution of Nigeria. The con-
stitution of Nigeria also acknowledges directive principles of state policy.
In Chapter Two we encounter the formulation: "Fundamenta! Objectives
and Directive Principles of State 'Policy". Art. 14 reads: "It shall be the
duty and responsibility of all organs of government and of all authori-
ties and persons, exercising legislative, executive or judicia! powers to
conform to, observe and apply the provisions of this chapter." The
Federal Republic of Nigeria is qualified in Art. 15 as a state based on
the principles of democracy and social justice.
Again: this is not the language of rights, but of ideals. "The State
shall, within the context of the ideals and objectives for which provi-
sions are made in this Constitution (...)" and what follows is that the
economy should be instituted that maximizes prosperity, freedom and
the happiness of every single citizen. A little further on it says: "The
State shall direct its policy towards ensuring (...)".
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Apa;rt from these obligations falling on the state, there are also oblig-
ations falling on the citizens. Art. 24 proclaims it the duty of every cit-
izen to respect the constitution; to protect public property; the prestige
and good name of the country; to defend democratic processes and prac-
tices and participate therein. These principles of state policy have a sup-
plementary provision in the "Fundamental Rights" of Chapter four,
where we find the traditional list of human rights that we Europeans
are so familiar with.
A third illustration is the constitution of India. In Chapter four it is
explicidy stated that the directive principles are not justiciable. Art. 37
reads: "The provisions contained in this part shall not he enforced hy
any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless funda-
mental in the govemance of the country and it shall he the duty of the
State to apply these principles in making laws." So the constitutional
lawmaker contradicts· the widely held view that principles have to he
justiciahle in order to he important.
We also find in the constitution of India formulations that make it
clear that they require an effort from the state to realize certain social
goals. "The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people hy
securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which
justice, social, economie and political, shall infonn all the institutions of
the national life", according to Art. 38.1 of the Indian constitution. The
language of "striving" (and not of rights) we also find in the second part
of this article: "The State shall, in particular, strive to minimise the
inequalities of income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status,
facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals hut also amongst
groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different
vocations."
2.12 BETWEEN.. LETTERS Tü SANTA CLAUS74
AND REAL RIGHTS
If the language of efforts and directive principles of state policy as an
alternative for the language of social rights is a serious option, the clas-
sic opposition hetween those who reject social rights and those who advo-
cate the realisation of those rights is recnsilable. What stimulates much
of the controversy hetween the twO camps is the failure to address the
appropriate topics for discussion. It is perfecdy possihle to advocate that
74 See C. Orwin and T. Pangle, 'The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights',
in: M.F. Plattner (ed.), Human Rights in Dur Time, 1984, pp. 1-22, p. 15 who qualify
social constitutional rights as letters to Santa Claus.
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particular tasks fall to the state in the field of poverty relief and redis-
tribution of wealth on moral and political grounds and at the same time
to reject the use of the language of social rights for constitutional rea-
sons. The values of social justice and equality are simply not adequately
protected behind a rhetorical façade of social "rights". Social ideals are
better served when presented as directive principles of state policy ·than
as real rightS. 75
One may be inclined to consider this view as a kind of radical lib-
ertarianism that has lost all contact with the reality of present day con-
stitution making. 76 This would not be accurate, however. Steiner and
Alston rightly say that the proclamation of human rights as "universal,
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated (Vienna Declaration, para
5)" is misleading: "this formal consensus masks a deep and enduring dis-
agreement over the proper status of economié, social and cultural rights. "77
The proclamation of the indivisibility of rights in the Vienna Declaration
is an illusion. Not all rights are of the same importance. Not everything
that is proclaimed in formal treaties and constitutions is realistic: In many
cases there is an utopian element at play. What is proclaimed is some-
thing that perhaps one day may become a right-and even that can be
contested on the grounds mentioned above.
It is not very likely that within the foreseeable future the status of
social rights will change. Again Steiner and Alston are more realistic
than many other commentators when they write: "with the rejection of
communism, the widespread embrace of free-market economic solutions
and increasing global economic and social integration, economic and
social rights are certain to remain at the center of controversy in the
years ahead."78
75 See also: E. Mureinik, 'Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economie Rights in the
Constitution', in: South Ajrican ]oumal qf Human Rights, no. 8, 1992, pp. 464-474.
76 See for a wen argued defence of 1ibertarianism: M.N. Rothbard, The Ethics qfLiberty~
with a new introduction by Hans-Hermann Hoppe (New York University Press-New York and
London 2002 (1998)).
77 HJ. Steiner and P. Alston (ed.), Intemational Human Rights in Context. Law; politics~
morals~ Text and Materials (Clarendon Press-Oxford 1996), p. 256.
78 Steiner and Alston, Ibid. p. 257.
